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Scienter and the Flexible Duty Under Rule lob-5

A major focus of private litigation under rule lob-5l is the determination of the proper standard or duty applicable to alleged violators of the
rule. Legislative2 and administrative3 histories are not helpful in establishing a civil action standard, for they are couched in the language of
common law fraud. The rule itself is written in strict liability language.4
Realizing that rule lob-5 was enacted to deter many forms of fraudulent activity,5 most courts have rejected the extreme standards of strict
liability6 and common law fraud,7 and have chosen an intermediate test
'A private right of action under rule lob-5 was not always available. I t is clear today, however, that one exists. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (Supreme Court recognizes a private action); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION
3871 (1969); Note, Proof of
Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-fraud Rule lob-5, 63 MICH.L.R. 1070,
1072 (1965).
2"The [Senate] Report.. . is replete with words and phrases indicating that the act was
designed primarily to prohibit fraudulent activities. Nowhere does the Report imply that
liability without culpability would attach for material misrepresentations." Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,277 (3d Cir. 1972).
Wpon releasing rule lob-5, the SEC stated, "the new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud. . . by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase." SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3230
(May 2 1,1942).
4Rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. $ 240,lOb-5(Supp. 1974), Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
5See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 278 (3d Cir. 1972); Trussel v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 771 (D. Colo. 1964) (for recovery in a private
action, a party must prove violation of a criminal statute); 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES
LAW:
FRAUDSEC RULE lob-5 5 2.2 (420) at 22.7 (1970); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations
Under Rule lob-5,32 U. CHI.L. REV.824,825 (1965).
6"If we choose to deter, say, misrepresentations, we may think it wise to go all the way and
make innocent misrepresentations actionable. But this reduces incentives to be careful, since
care is no defense (though it may still prevent a misrepresentation from occurring)." 2 A.
BROMBERG,
SECURITIES
LAW;FRAUD
SEC RULElob-5, 5 8.4(508) at 204.1 14 (1971). "Moreover,
despite some dicta suggesting that the second clause [Rule lob-5(b)] provides for absolute
liability, no court has been willing to apply such a stringent standard." Mann, Rule lob-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.1206, 1207-08 (1970).
7"There has. . . been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of
fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangible
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they refer to as scienter. Scienter, however, is a term of art and its definition changes with the court and the facts of the particular case.8
Judges and commentators can be found to support the proposition
that the version of scienter to be applied in rule lob-5 cases is a combination of one or more of the following: knowledgeYgintent,1° reckl e ~ s n e s s or
, ~ ~negligence.12 Bromberg states that [p] robably the most
important step in clarifying the law of scienter would be to ban the
word."l3 Another commentator, Mann,14 suggests that the proper
analysis is to develop a flexible standard which can adjust to the wide
variety of conduct found in alleged rule lob-5 violations. Rather than
elicit criteria which might enable courts to use the proposed standard,
Mann merely cites cases holding the defendant to a higher or lower duty
"

items of wealth are ill suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, and that
accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue (footnotes omitted)."
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); See also Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
8Bromberg breaks scienter into three general categories with sub-areas under each as follows:
I. Knowledge
A. Actual
B. Constructive Knowledge
11. State of Mind
A. Intent
B. Purpose or Motive
C. Bad Faith
111. Care
A. Recklessness
B. Negligence
supra note 6, O 8.4(504) at 204.104.
2 A. BROMBERG,
9See generally Lama v. Drexel and Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1973); Bowman &
Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Mass. 1969) affd per curiam 417 F.2d 780
(1st Cir. 1969); Globus v. Law Research, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 2 A.
BROMBERG,
supra note 6, O 8.4(504) at 204.104-05; Bucklo, Scienter and Rule IOb-5, 67 Nw.
U. L. REV.562,570 (1972).
'Osee generally Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); Gerstle v. Ganble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); O'Neill v.
Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) af4d 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Ruder, Texas
Gulf Sulphur- The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchase and
Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV.423,44142,444 11.107 (1968).
llSEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 883, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (concurring
opinion); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772-73 (D. Colo. 1964); Professor Loss says that "scienter has been. . . variously defined to mean everything from knowing
falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various gradations of recklessness, down
to such non-action as is virtually equivalent to negligence or eien liability without fault . . . ."
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATIONS
1432 (2d ed. 1961).
12See generally City Nat'l. Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-31 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir.
1968); Sandler and Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30
OHIOST. L.J. 225, 270-72 (1969); Note, Scienter and Rule lob-5, 69 COLUM.L. REV. 1057-67
(1969).
132 A. BROMBERG,
supra note 6 , s 8.4(503) at 204.103.
14&Iann,supra note 6, at 1209-20.
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depending on the presence or absence of certain facts.l5

It is within this context that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
White v . Abrams,l6 announced that past definitions of scienter are unworkable and adopted a standard based on duty which adjusts to the particular fact situation of each case.17 T h e court stated that the strictness
of the duty depends on the particular facts involved, and then listed five
specific factors that the jury may use to determine the defendant's particular duty.
In White, a group of investors, who had a long and trusted relationship
with the defendant Abrams, were induced by him to loan money at 12 to
14 percent interest per annum and to buy stock in twenty-six corporations controlled and owned by Theodore Richmond. When the Richmond corporations went bankrupt in 1967, the plaintiffs charged
Abrams with common law fraud and violation of rule lob-5, alleging
that he misrepresented (1) the financial position of Richmond and his
corporations, (2) the use to be made of the loaned funds, and (3) the Richmond corporations' earnings. Plaintiffs also alleged that Abrams did not
disclose (1) that he earned large commissions on investments in the Richmond corporations and (2) that similar investments were made through
Abrams at higher interest rates (up to 20 percent).18 The district court
interpreted two prior Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisionslg to require a strict liability jury instruction and Abrams was found liableazO
The court of appeals, however, held that the jury charge was erroneous
and that a flexible duty standard was required under rule lob-5. Without limiting the trial court from varying the factors to be considered by
the jury, the court listed the following as some to be considered:
. . . (1) the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's access to the information as compared to plaintiffs access, (3) the
benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, (4) the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making his investment decisions, and (5) the defendant's
activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.21
'5blann supports rejection of the phrases of negligence and scienter for a balancing approach which would consider the relationship of the parties, type of relief sought, the plantiffs
character, and the motivation and nature of the culpable conduct. Id. at 1206-09.
'6495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
supra note 6,
"The White court cites Mann, supra note 6, at 1209 and 2 A. BROMBERG,
5 8.4(513) at 204.115 (1971) in announcing that past definitions of scienter are unworkable.
495 F.2d at 733-34.
'8495 F.2d at 727 (9th Cir. 1974).
lgRoyal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1961).
20495F.2d at 734 (9th Cir. 1974).
21Zd.at 735-36.
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Another case adopting the flexible duty approach for rule lob-5 cases
, ~ ~ was decided subsequent to but
is Hochfelder v. Ernst & E r n ~ twhich
did not mention White. Because Hochfelder adopts a flexible duty without expanding it beyond the traditional negligence concept of causation,
duty, and breach, this comment will be confined to the five factors listed
in White and the analysis therein. The purpose of this comment is (1) to
analyze the factors listed in White in terms of the purposes of rule 1Ob-5,
(2) to discuss some reasons why the presence or absence of the factors in a
particular case cause the standard to become more stringent or lax, and
(3) to explain how the adoption of a flexible standard effectuates the
purposes behind enactment of the rule. This approach is novel because
it focuses on a duty which changes according to the particular facts.
Other courts have required differing versions of scienter depending on
the existence or absence of the factors listed in White, but none has
adopted the unique approach of a flexible duty.

The basic purpose of rule lob-5 is to deter fraudulent activity in securities transactions. Its major thrust, similar to that of the federal securities
laws taken as a whole, is one of full disclosure - the basic premise being
that persons should be able to deal as they wish. Of course, they cannot
deal as they wish unless they are fully aware of all the material facts. Although congressional history does not clearly state the purpose of the rule
in these t e r m ~ , the
~ 3 Supreme Court has said that the purpose of securities
legislation in general is ". . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry. "24 Thus, the purpose is not
to create a scheme of investor's insurance25in which courts analyze each
transaction to insure its fairness, but rather to prompt parties to fully
disclose material facts by imposing penalties26 for failure to do so. Each
party is then left to decide for himself whether he will purchase or sell the
securities. With full disclosure, parties can still enter into unfair trans22503F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
2 3 C o ~Fraud
,
in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule IOb-5's Application to Acts of Corporate
Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. k v . 674, 675 n.3 (1972); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
IOb-5:Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 N w . U.L. k v . 627,64240 (1963).
24SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
25E.g.,List V. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 45'7, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 81 1
(1965).
26Criminal sanctions are not the only possible penalties under the rule. Courts have
realized that a private action can also have a penalizing and deterring effect on those involved
in securities transactions. For this reason, Stone has commented that civil actions help police
the securities market by (1) the bringing of cases that the SEC cannot bring because of its
limited resources, (2) providing for potentially higher monetary damages than criminal proceedings, (3) and by filling in the gaps left by the singular application of criminal penalties.
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actions, but they will do so knowingly, and fraudulent activity will be
deterred.
While deterrence is a worthwhile goal, it should be recognized that all
fraud cannot be prevented. Thus, another purpose of rule lob-5 is to
make judicial machinery available which will restore plaintiffs who have
relied on less than full and accurate disclosure. Upon showing a violation of the rule, plaintiffs are then entitled to damages and/or recission
of the sale to compensate them for their loss.

The flexible duty standard, as developed by the factors listed in White,
is based primarily on two important concepts - the foreseeability of the
plaintiff's reliance by the defendant and the benefit that the defendant
derives from the transaction. Reliance is not a new concept in rule lob-5
litigation, but the flexible duty approach uses it differently than most
courts have done in the past. The traditional use of reliance has been to
Under the flexible duty apmake it a necessary element of ca~sation.~7
proach, the plaintiff's reasonable reliance upon defendant's misrepresentation or failure to disclose is still a necessary element in the proof of
causation, but the foreseeability of that reliance by the defendant also
affects the defendant's duty. Whenever it is reasonably foreseeable to a
defendant that the plaintiff may rely upon his information or judgment,
the defendant is under a more stringent duty to truthfully disclose all
material facts. In this context, three of the factors listed in White relationship, access to inf~rmation,~s
and awareness of reliance -become crucial as elements of proof which substantiate forseeability of reliance. When these factors are proved, the defendant's duty becomes
more stringent because the probability and foreseeability of reliance are
greater.
Another important factor which causes the duty to vary is the benefit
defendant receives from the securities transaction. The reasoning is that
the motivation to mislead is greater when the deceiver stands to be rewarded for such action. The court addressed this problem directly in
one factor and indirectly in another, holding the defendant to a higher
duty when he actually benefits from or when he is active in initiating the
transaction. Together, initiation and benefit are elements of proof
(The criminal sections of the Exchange Act are probably not sufficient deterrents because of
their limited $10,000 penalty, the reluctance of investors to institute criminal actions, and the
problems following discovery and prosecution.) Stone, Fashioning a Lid for Pandora's Box:
A Legitimate Role for Rule lob-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National
Stock Exchange, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV.404,411 (1969).
27See Comment, Reliance Under Rule lob-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?,
72 COLUM.
L. REV.562,565 (1972).
28Reliance is only justified if the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the defendant's
access to information. If the plaintiff has no knowledge, his reliance is unreasonable.
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giving foundation to the probability of an improper motive or ix~tent.~g

A. Foreseeability of Reliance: Relationship of Defendant to Plaintiff
The relationship of the parties in a securities transaction has been
crucial to the outcome of many cases.30 In Mills v . Sarjem Corp.,3l former shareholders brought suit against the purchasers of their shares who
were involved in a scheme to gain control of a bridge building corporation and then sell the bridges to the county at a profit. Noting that the
transaction was at arms length and that the shares were purchased at a
prive above fair market value, the court held that the purchasers had no
duty to divulge their future plans concerning the resale of the property
because no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties." In
another case, Phillips v . Reynolds 6 C 0 . p it was held that no duty to disclose material facts existed under rule lob-5 absent a special relationship
~ defendant-broker was not held liable for
between the ~ a r t i e s . 3The
failure to disclose a corporate deficit of nine million dollars when
plaintiff had information explaining that twelve million dollars had
been put into the corporation without profit.
The existence of a fiduciary relationship has been an important consideration the courts have used to apply a higher and more exacting duty
upon defendants.35 A formal fiduciary relationship exists when one of
the parties is in a position classified by the law as a fiduciary. T h e three
most important fiduciary positions found in securities law are brokerdealer,36 director,37 and corporate insider.38 Persons in all three posi29The White court says, "we reject scienter or any other discussion of state of mind as a
necessary and separate element of a lob-5 action." 495 F.2d at 734. Later on the court states,
however, "While rejecting scienter and state of mind concepts as the standard itself, it [the
flexible duty] requires the court to consider state of mind as an important factor in determining
the scope of duty that Rule lob-5 imposes." 495 F.2d at 736.
S0See, e.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.
1973); Branham v. Material Systems Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Rothschild
v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,681-82 (N.D. Ind. 1966),affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
3l133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
32Zd. at 764.
33294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
34Zd. at 1255.
s5Seegenerally cases cited note 30 supra; Comment, supra note 27 at 574.
36See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (higher
duty for fiduciary which Congress recognized the investment advisor to be); Hanley v. SEC, 415
F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (securities dealer has a special relationship with investors because
his position implicitly warrants that his representations have adequate support); O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1964) (breach of fiduciary duty owed by broker or
dealer may very well be the type of fraudulent activity barred by the rule); Smith v. Bear,
237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956) (strict liability language applied to a broker-dealer because
of his relationship to plaintiff); Mann, supra note 6, at 1210.
37See, e.g., Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314-15, (5th Cir. 1959) (president and general
manager held to a higher duty of a fiduciary); hlann, supra note 6, at 1210; Note, Proof of
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tions are held to a higher duty because the law assumes that it is clearly
foreseeable to such persons that those who associate with them will probably rely more heavily on the information which they disseminate39
An informal fiduciary relationship exists when the parties have developed a relationship of trust and reliance over a substantial period of
time.40 In Myzel u. Fields,4l the Second Circuit considered important
the fact that plaintiffs were dependent upon and trusted Myzel, who was
not only a close friend and financial advisor, but a relative to the oper, ~ ~Fifth Circuit refused to
ators of the company. In Vohs v . D i ~ k s o nthe
hold a seller liable for failure to inform purchasers as to the nontransferability of the private shares he sold them. Because the court felt it unnecessary to determine whether these shares had actually been issued
under a private exemption, it refused to decide whether this failure had
But
contravened a ruling by the Securities and Exchange Comrni~sion.~3
the court did consider the relationship which was merely one of fellow
employees, and the fact that no other sales had been made which would
foster trust in the seller, to conclude that a higher duty was not proper.
In essence, the court held that the relationship was not one in which the
purchaser's reliance was foreseeable by the seller.
Another kind of relationship that has been given attention by the
courts involves professionals, accountants, lawyers, and those with many
years of securities experience who make statements as experts.44 These
defendants are held to a higher standard of care than nonexperts "because
investors may be expected to rely on their statements or because they
should know better. "45 In Drake v . Thor Power Tool Co., 46 an account-

Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-fraud Rule lob-5,63 MICH.L. b v , 1070,
1079-80 (1965) (both discuss the higher duty that the law exacts upon those who are "closely
associated with an issuing corporation"). But cf: O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767-68
(breach of a general fiduciary relationship not enough for liability under lob-5; breach must
involve a sale or exchange).
38See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-42 (7th Cir. 1963) (rule lob-5 clearly creates
a fiduciary relationship between "insiders" and "outsiders" with the higher duty upon the
insiders); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 139-40 (D. Md. 1968) (rule lob-5 imposes a higher
duty upon insiders dealing with outsiders); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,
828-29 (D. Del. 1951) (insiders, such as majority stockholders, cannot purchase minority
stockholders' shares without complying with the duty imposed on a fiduciary).
39See generally notes 36-38 supra.
40White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th
Cir. 1968); Rothschild v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
dl386 F.2d 718,735 (8th Cir. 1968).
42495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974).
43Zd. at 625. (SEC had ruled that a seller must inform the buyer as to any limitations on
resale and holding of securities because of being issued under an exemption from registration.)
44See generally Blakely v. Lisac 357 F. Supp. 255, 266 (D. Ore. 1972); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1208-09 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Bowman & Bourdon Inc. v. Rohr,
296 F. Supp. 847, 851-52 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd 417 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1969); Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. 111. 1967).
45Mann,supra note 6, at 1213.

46282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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ing firm was charged with certifying false financial statements and using
incorrect auditing procedures. The court held on a motion to dismiss
that accountants have a peculiar relationship with the public and as
such cannot be immunized from suit though they have not benefited
the court stated
from their misrepresentation^.^^ In Blakely v . Li~ac,~g
that an attorney could not "escape liability for fraud 'by closing his eyes
to what he saw and could readily understand.' "49 There, an attorneydirector of the corporation was held liable for misleading financial information in the prospectus which he should have investigated.
Therefore, the reasoning behind the imposition of a more stringent
duty on experts and those in the position of a fiduciary is that the relationship makes plaintiff's reliance more foreseeable to the defendant. In
that situation, a strict duty is deemed necessary to deter the defendant
from being dishonest. Thus, the imposition of a higher duty makes the
parties' positions more equal - facilitating the disclosure of material
information, deterring fraudulent activity, and allowing the parties to
bargain as they wish.

B. Foreseeability of Reliance: Defendant's Access to Information as
Compared to Plaintiffs Access
The comparative access of the parties to information has been the subject of many judicial opinions, with most courts holding the party with
the higher access to the higher duty.50 The reasoning is best explained
in Speed u. Transamerica Corp., where the court said:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing
material facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority
stockholder by virtue of his inside position but not known to the selling
minority stockholder, which information would have affected the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of
preuenting a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair
advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to
provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that
the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction.51
47Zd.at 104-05.
48357F. Supp. 225 (D. Ore. 1972).
49Zd.at 266.
50See generally City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1970);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1965); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360
F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc.,
353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905,915-16 (W.D. Mo. 1970);
Bennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
5199F. Supp. 808,828-29 (D. Del. 1951) (emphasis added).
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Traditionally, courts have treated access to information and duty
according to three defendant cla&ifications- "insider, "52 "tippee, '53
and "broker-dealer."54 While each has been held to a higher duty because of his greater access to information, it should be emphasized that
these classifications are legal conclusions and should be rejected if not
supported by the facts. The proper analysis then deals with access to
information55 rather than fitting each defendapt into a particular classification. As the court in Harnett v . Ryan Homes, Inc., explained,
The question of who is an "insider," therefore, cannot be decided on the
basis of the title one holds in the corporate organization. A director, or
officer, or even the president of a corporation cannot always and invariably be classified as an insider. The analysis turns instead, on the basis of
what a party knows or reasonably should know considering the information to which he has access.56

In another case, Vohs v . D i ~ k s o n the
, ~ ~Fifth Circuit refused to hold the
defendant to a higher duty even though he was the plaintiff's superior
and "key" employee for a stock purchase plan. The court reasoned that
defendant's superior position did not give him greater access to informat ion.
There are two major reasons why the finding of greater access requires the imposition of a higher duty. First, those with greater access
can more easily defraud others58 and the imposition of a higher duty pro52An insider is assumed to have greater access to information because of his position in the
corporation. His status, by definition, entitles him to direct information not available to the
public. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States- The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule IOb-5,1973 UTAHL. REV.119, 123-24.
53A tippee is distinguished from an insider because his information is received indirectly,
e.g., from an insider, rather than directly from the corporation. Courts often confuse the two.
Id. at 125-26.
54A broker-dealer is assumed to have higher access, not because he has some connection to
corporate information, but because he is an expert and can better analyze market information.
He also is more familiar with how the market information is obtained. Id. at 125-26.
55

[TI he nondisclosed facts here were in Rhoade's [defendant's] personal knowledge or
private files and were not available to Rochez [plaintiff] . . . . Thus, Rochez's status as an
insider, his financial expertise and his business acumen are all irrelevant, for he had no
access to the critical information or any opportunity to discover the non-disclosed facts.
Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,419 (3d Cir. 1974).
56360 F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (citation omitted); 32 U. CHI. L. REV.824 (1965).
57495 F.2d 607,623 (5th Cir. 1974).
58

T h e fraud involved in buying or selling on the basis of inside information is based first
on the user's relationship with the corporation being such as to allow his access to information intended only for a corporate purpose- not for his personal benefit. For the
instant, we shall assume this to have been met. Secondly, the fraud rests ". . . upon the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
912 (1961)."
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tects plaintiffs by making violations of the rule easier to prove. The
party with superior access realizes that incomplete disclosures or misrepresentations are easier to prove and is therefore more likely to disclose
material information.59 Second, the defendant with greater access to information is more likely to be relied upon by the other party," and a
higher duty, which puts both parties in a more equal bargaining position,G1 is necessary to deter the defendant fiom utilizing plaintiff's reliance unfairly.
Courts have also considered the plaintiff's access to information62 in
determining whether his reliance was foreseeable and reasonable, as
stated in City National Bank v . Vanderboom:
Not only should the plaintiff have to prove that he relied on defendant's
statements, but he must convince the trier of fact that his reliance was
reasonable under all the circumstances at the time. In this way recovery
would be denied to those who, because of their "business sophistication",
acumen, or ready access to the information involved, could reasonably be
expected to exercise a higher degree of care and investigation in their
dealings.63

Plaintiffs who are experts or have ready access to information have
been denied recovery by the process of holding the defendant to a lower
loaned money to investors who used
duty.64 In V a n d e r b ~ o m a, ~bank
~
the funds to buy stock. When the bank sued to recover on the outstandSchoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.),
modified, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); The real problem under rule lob-5 being the injury
to the plaintiff, there is no concern that the defendant violated some fiduciary duty that he
owed to the corporation.
59See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d
819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp.
264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966); But cf. Vohs v. Dickson,
495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974). T h e court refused to hold the defendant liable for knowledge
of financial matters where he was an ordinary employee with access because of his ownership
of stock. Plaintiff had no access to corporate books.
6OReliance is only justified if the plaintiff actually knows that the defendant has higher access
or assumes higher access because of the defendant's position -insider, broker-dealer, or corporate director.
GISpeed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,828-29 (D. Del. 1951).
62The law often assumes that experts or professionals have greater access to information.
See Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan & Co., 309 F. Supp. 849,859 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
63422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (citation omitted).
W e e generally Fey v. Walston, Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire
Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Wiggs, 443 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1971) (shareholder who sued the president of the corporation for failure to disclose inside information was
barred recovery when the court found that the information was available to plaintiff through
the public market); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); Baumel
v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp.
1200, 1209 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (insider's duty of disclosure depends in part upon the extent of
knowledge and access to information of party he is dealing with).
65422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir;), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
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ing investors' notes, the defendant investors counterclaimed that a bank
officer had misrepresented the financial position of those corporations
in which the borrowed money had been invested. T h e counterclaim was
dismissed because the court found that the investors had ready access to
the information from other sources.66 In another case, Colonial Realty
Corp. v . Brunswick Corp.,67 the court refused to find liability when the
interest rate and terms of a financial agreement guaranteed by the defendant were left off the company's prospectus. T h e omission was
deemed immaterial because the interest rate had been discussed in various financial magazines and the plaintiff was an experienced dealer in
this particular stock.68
C. Foreseeability of Reliance: T h e Defendant's Awareness of Whether
the Plaintiff Was Relying upon Their Relationship

The issue of foreseeability and its proof through relationship and
comparative access to information is immaterial if it can be proven that
the defendant knew that the plaintiff was in fact relying upon their relationship. The guessing game is over, opportunity for abuse is great, and
the courts have responded with a higher duty that meets the fact situation.69 The higher duty is justified by the same arguments used for
relationship and access, but the arguments are even stronger when the
issue is not probable, but actual reliance.
D. Benefit to the Defendant: T h e Benefit That the Defendant Derives
from the Relationship
Courts have held defendants to a higher duty where they make repreIn
sentations in the course of an economically motivated transa~tion.~O
Affiliated Ute Citizens IJ.United States,71 the Supreme Court held that
66

The investors had access to all the books and records of AHB and PL and I during the
four month option period. . . . (They also had access to the auditor's report) Since the
investors. . . had ready access to the information involved, it is reasonable to expect
them to exercise a higher degree of care than third parties [bank] . . . .
I d . at 231.
'j7337 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
6*Zd. at 557.
69See, e.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363, 373-74 (2d
Cir. 1973); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255,264 (D. Ore. 1972).
'Osee, Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905, 916 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (investors who had ready
access to information held to a higher duty than third parties who didn't profit from the
transaction); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind.
1966) (insider can breach his duty to outsider even though the advantage to be gained comes
from third parties); But cJ: Fey v. Walston 8c Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1048 (7th Cir. 1974) (if salesman fulfills his fiduciary and other obligations of honesty with a customer, additional motive
for commissions does not make him liable).
71406U.S. 128, 147 (1972).
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if the two defendants and the bank had acted merely as transfer agents,
they would have had no duty to disclose information. As it was, they
were found liable because they benefited from the transactions by way of
commissions and higher bank deposits. In Carr v. Warner,72 the
court, in determining that no liability existed, considered the fact that
defendants made no unusual profit. In Chasins v. Smith Barney 6.C O . , ~ ~
the defendant stock broker was held liable when he failed to advise the
plaintiff that he was making a market in securities which he had recommended highly to the plaintiff. The Second Circuit said that the duty is
higher "where one ['s] motivation is economic self-interest. . . . The
economic self-interest of a market-maker in over-the-counter securities
may be greater than that of a simple principle, and the market-maker
status should have been disclosed."74
Although actual benefit is not required for recovery,75its presence is
certainly a major factor in the determination of liability. It is easier for
the court to find a party who benefited liable than one who did not?
As an element of proof going toward improper motive or intent, benefit
is only important when it gives insight into the defendant's probable
motives for arranging the transaction. A person in a position to benefit
from a securities transaction is considered more likely to shade the truth
or to withhold material information, especially when his benefit increases with the falsity of his representation. When the defendant is
benefited equally by false or true statements, as in the case of an attorney
or an accountant whose benefit is merely a fee for services performed,
other considerations of relationship, access to information, and reliance
are more material.77

E. Benefit to the Defendant: Defendant's Activity in Initiating
the Transaction
The defendant's activity in initiating the transaction has been an imOne commentator79 has suggested that
portant factor in several ~ases.~8
initiation is the crucial difference between two cases with similar fact
situations. In Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan elr Co.,SOthe court placed great
72 137 F. Supp. 6 1 1,614-15 (D. Mass. 1955).
73(1969-1970 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fi 92,712 (2d Cir. July 7, 1970).
741d.at 99, 137.
supra note 6, 5 8.5(584) at 208.47-48.
75See 2 A. BROMBERG,
76Zd.at 204.48.
771d.
78See,e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); Hecht v. Harris, Upham 8c Co., 283 F.
Supp. 417 (N.D. Calif. 1968).
79Mann,supra note 6 at 1219-20.
B0309 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y.1970).
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weight upon the fact that the plaintiff had initiated the transaction and
that it was his "lust for new issues" which led him to the defendants.
Plaintiff's activity in initiating the deal was significant in the court's
holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove material misrepresentations
l
and reliance. Similarly, in Hafner v . Forest Laboratories Z n ~ . , ~the
Third Circuit held that no material misrepresentations occurred but
asserted that if the defendant had initiated the transactions, triable issues
of fact might then have been raised. In Canizaro v . Kohlmeyer 6.C O . , ~ ~
the court emphasized initiation and participation in the transaction
when it stated that a "broker's obligation to his customer to investigate
and disclose all material facts must surely increase in direct proportion to
the degree of his participation in the sale."83
The purpose for holding the initiator or major participant to a higher
duty is based on the assumption that the initiator or participant must
stand to benefit from the transaction and, therefore, has more reasons to
act with improper motives. It is clear that one with intent to defraud by
using secret information can rarely take advantage of his situation unless
he becomes involved in a stock transaction. T h e initiation may be the
outgrowth of a plan to defraud through concealment or misrepresentations. This logic applies to all parties in a transaction and case law has
reflected this view by holding plaintiffs as well as defendants to a higher
duty if they are active in initiating the exchange.84
DUTYAS AFFECTED
BY FORESEEABLE
IV. THEFLEXIBLE
AND BENEFIT
RELIANCE
Five fact situations encompass the flexible duty as it is affected by foreseeable reliance and benefit. Assuming actual misrepresentations, they
are: (1) intent to defraud, (2) foreseeable reliance and benefit, (3) foreseeable reliance, (4) benefit, and (5) a mere misrepresentation of material
information -absent any of the other four. How these five situations
affect the flexible duty can best be explained by use of the diagram on the
following page.
T h e flexible duty is dependent upon and changes according to the
arrangement of the several factors on the scale. Assuming the factors are
proven at trial, all of them except a mere misrepresentation would increase the defendant's duty. A mere misrepresentation is shown by
putting no weight on the scale and allowing the pointer to rest in the area
of no liability. Benefit, alone, would probably not be sufficient for a
violation of the rule absent an intentional misrepresentation. T h e
major use of benefit is in combination with other factors which by them'3'345 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir.1965).
S2370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974).
83Zd.at 289.
84See generally supra note 78.
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selves would not require a high enough duty for a violation. Foreseeable
reliance by itself would probably support a violation. The standard
would be something higher than negligence since the defendant who can
foresee the plaintiff's reliance is not in the same position as the average
reasonable man. Foreseeable reliance with benefit does not make for an
automatic violation, but the defendant should use extreme care to get
information to the plaintiff so as to prevent a material misrepresentation.
This is especially so if the defendant stands to benefit from the transaction. Intent to defraud is the highest duty, and if present, rule lob-5 is
always violated since the language of the rule was enacted to deter and
specifically forbids fraud.
The effect or weight of each factor varies according to the proof given
at trial. For example, proof that the defendant knew the plaintiff was
relying on their relationship in making investment decisions would
create a greater shift on the scale than would evidence that the defendant
had greater access to information, but had not used his access to get more
information. In essence, there is a direct relationship between the
weight of the evidence in support of each factor and the effect that each
factor has on duty as represented by the scale.

T h e flexible duty of White is an outgrowth of rule lob-5 litigation and
represents one court's attempt to define a standard which meets all the
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fact situations possible in a rule lob-5 violation. In rejecting the application of singular terms, such as scienter, the flexible duty approach rejects
legal conclusions for a more detailed analysis based on five factors. It
gives potential parties a checklist of factors which they can use to determine the degree of care required in their situation to avoid liability.
By giving potential violators a checklist so that duty can be determined before security transactions are engaged in, the court has given
effect to the deterrent purpose of the rule without overburdening the
market with a duty, such as strict liability, that would keep persons from
acting for fear of a violation. This is accomplished by imposing no higher
duty than evolves from the facts. For example, only those who benefit
from the transaction and who foresee the other party's reliance are burdened with the duty of extreme care. Where these two elements are
lacking, the defendant has a lesser duty not to intentionally misrepresent
material facts. In both situations, the deterrent effect is the same. T h e
differing standard is justified by the separate facts in each case.
A major problem with the flexible duty is that the extreme care required when foreseeable reliance and benefit are present is too close to
strict liability. Broker-dealers, and other experts who would most often
be held to the duty of extreme care, may not be able to meet the standard
if a misrepresentation is found. The problem is increased by the fact
that broker-dealers often cannot obtain liability insurance to protect
themselves. Unless they have sufficient assets for self-insurance, one
conviction for violating the rule could result in bankruptcy. Courts
could remedy this problem, however, by refraining from imposing the
extreme care standard unless it is clearly justified by the facts. Another
answer may be to equate extreme care with that degree of care exercised
by other broker-dealers in similar situations. In any event, courts are
capable of adjusting the duty so that it produces fair and just results.
In conclusion, the flexible duty approach is a realistic solution to rule
lob-5. The duty effectuates the purpose of the rule, adjusts to the possible fact situations, and reveals analysis that can be used to determine
the applicable standard of care for persons involved in security transactions.

